

# IETA's Recommendations on Strengthening India's Article 6 Framework

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## INTRODUCTION

IETA appreciates the efforts by the Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Climate Change (MoEFCC) and Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE), Ministry of Power of the Government of India in its efforts to establish the Indian Carbon Market (ICM), through the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS). As the trusted business voice on emissions trading globally, IETA has been supporting the advancement of market-based climate policy instruments on behalf of our members since 1999. We have seen the opportunities markets can bring and the challenges facing them. Building on our experience and international expertise with approximately 300+ global member companies, we look to support the design of effective carbon markets in India to deliver on sustainable development, green growth and achievement of the Paris Agreement targets.

India stands at a defining inflection point in its engagement with international carbon markets. With an enhanced nationally determined contribution (NDC) for 2031–35 — targeting a 47% reduction in emissions intensity of GDP from 2005 levels, increasing non-fossil power capacity to 60%, and scaling carbon sinks to 3.5 – 4 billion tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>e — sets a strong foundation for climate action, but also requires significant levels of finance, technology and investment to be delivered effectively. In this context, Article 6 should not be viewed as competing with domestic mitigation efforts or undermining NDC achievement, but as a strategic instrument to support and accelerate implementation. With its domestic Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) now operational and growing international demand for high-quality carbon credits, India is well positioned to operationalise Article 6 in a way that strengthens NDC delivery, mobilises private capital, and establishes the country as one of Asia's most important Article 6 supply markets within this decade.

A well-designed Article 6 framework can unlock significant climate finance, support cost-effective mitigation, and position India as a leading supplier of high-integrity carbon credits.

In this context, the position paper focusses on two key areas:

- India's potential to build high integrity carbon credit supply for international market
- Recommendations to strengthen India's Article 6 framework

We look forward to engaging closely and continue working together for the advancement of effective carbon pricing and market instruments in India. For any questions, do not hesitate to reach out to the contacts listed at the end of this paper.

### I. India's potential to build high integrity carbon credit supply:

India has historically been a key contributor to global carbon credit markets, particularly under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of Kyoto Protocol. Out of total 7847 projects registered with the CDM, 1686 projects are from India. Approximately 12.6% (255 million) CER's were issued to Indian projects mainly from sectors such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, industrial gases, fuel switching, municipal solid waste, and forestry.<sup>1</sup> Following the transition from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement in 2016, the focus of issuance shifted from CDM to methodologies aligned with conventional voluntary carbon market (VCM) standards.



[1] Bureau of Energy Efficiency (2022), Policy paper on Indian Carbon Market

India continues to play an important role in the voluntary carbon market (VCM). Between 2010 to 2022, India has contributed around 370 million credits into the VCM, representing 18% of the global carbon credit supply.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the volume of carbon credits issued within India's voluntary carbon market (VCM) in the agri-food sector has continued to grow, reaching 3.19 million credits by 2024.<sup>3</sup> However, demand-side uptake remains comparatively limited, with only 1.9 million credits retired over the same period. This strong market presence highlights India's potential to leverage carbon pricing mechanisms to drive decarbonisation while attracting climate finance. Additionally, with increasing global demand for high-integrity carbon credits from various sources, India must embrace market-based mechanisms like carbon markets.

Research by IETA and the Center for Global Sustainability (CGS) at the University of Maryland highlights that India could generate significant revenue by proactively engaging in Article 6 cooperation as the country has as the country has strong potential for low-cost emissions reduction activities. In a net-zero scenario with full international cooperation, India could earn up to \$12.5 billion annually from the international Article 6 market by 2030. Cumulative financial flows from carbon credit sales between 2025 and 2050 could exceed \$200 billion, facilitating crucial international financing for additional mitigation activities in India.<sup>4</sup>

## II. Recommendations for Strengthening India's Article 6 Framework:

In 2025, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) issued an updated list of eligible activities for authorisation under Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement. The revised list narrows the scope to 13 activity types and excludes certain previously included activities, such as clean cooking. This represents an important step towards operationalising India's participation in international carbon markets. However, progress on bilateral cooperation under Article 6 remains at a nascent stage, with India having concluded only two agreements till date (with Japan and South Korea), while discussions with other partner countries are ongoing.

Based on consultations with a range of IETA's members – private sector stakeholders, including buyers, investors, project developers, and service providers, several implementation-related considerations have emerged. In this context, we would like to present the following recommendations to strengthen India's Article 6 framework, enhance market clarity, and facilitate greater participation from domestic and international stakeholders:

[2] [Carbon Offsets | Carbon Removals and Offsets Monitor](#)

[3] [Down to Earth, 2025, Indian Farmers must be central to carbon projects.](#)

[4] Edmonds, J., George, M., Yu, S., Forrister, D., and Bonzanni, A. (2023), *Modelling the Economics of Article 6, International Emissions Trading Association and Center for Global Sustainability (CBS) at the University of Maryland*

[5] [Article 6 Explainer: The Nature Conservancy.](#)

[6] Sylvera, 2025, [CORSIA Carbon Credit Supply vs Demand: Will Airlines Be Ready for 2028 Compliance?](#)

## 1. Accelerating Article 6 Implementation and Bilateral Engagements

As highlighted in [several studies](#), Article 6 can help significantly reducing the cost of achieving NDCs, facilitate increased climate ambition and sustainable development. If the savings from cooperative implementation of NDCs using Article 6 were reinvested in increased ambition, emissions mitigation could be more than doubled. Even in the case where not every country participates in cooperative mitigation, benefits always remain for those countries pursuing such cooperation. For countries such as India, with vast opportunities for cost-effective mitigation activities, Article 6 could bring about significant benefits in terms of international investments and financial flows. As highlighted in [our report](#), India alone could stand to gain up to \$12.5bn per year in international carbon market revenues by 2030.

Considering this potential, India has concluded only two bilateral agreements to date — with Japan in September 2025 and South Korea in April 2026 — while discussions with several other partner countries remain ongoing. In this context, there is a need to expedite the negotiation and finalisation of bilateral agreements under Article 6.2, supported by a clear, strategic, and coordinated national framework. Accelerating these efforts will enable India to capture early demand from several key buyer countries, including Singapore (25.1 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e), Sweden (20 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e), Norway (16.1 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e), Switzerland (20.3 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e), Saudi Arabia (30 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e).<sup>5</sup>

In addition, the European Union has introduced a binding interim 2040 climate target of a 90% reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels. Notably, this framework includes a flexibility allowing the use of high-quality international credits from 2036 onwards, covering up to 5% of net 1990 emissions. The aggregate demand for credits during 2036 – 2040 is estimated to range between 235 million and 1.18 billion tonnes, depending on the final interpretation of the regulation.

Furthermore, demand is expected from international compliance mechanisms such as Carbon Offsetting Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), which is currently transitioning from its voluntary phase (2021–2026) to the first compliance phase (2027–2035). As more countries participate and airlines face binding offsetting requirements, demand for eligible emissions units is expected to scale significantly, with estimates of up to 150-210 million before 2030.<sup>6</sup> To capture this opportunity, the Government of India should also prioritise aligning its Article 6 framework and domestic crediting mechanisms with CORSIA eligibility criteria and include approved methodologies and standards by ICAO.

In this context, India must act swiftly to secure partnerships and align its frameworks with evolving international requirements and position itself as a reliable and competitive supplier in global carbon markets.

## 2. Need a Clear and Transparent Article 6 Framework

It will be imperative to formulate a dedicated Article 6 framework that clearly defines the full project lifecycle — from project identification and registration to credit issuance to application for authorisation for export of credits. A transparent roadmap will provide much-needed certainty to project developers, investors, and international buyers, while positioning India as a credible and competitive supplier in global carbon markets. The following will be important to provide certainty to the investors:

- Clearly outlining the governance structure and process for developers looking to invest in eligible activities in getting an Article 6 Letter of Authorisation to issue and sell Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs). Who should they reach out to, and what are timelines for receiving confirmation or rejection?
- How can authorisation timeframes be facilitated for the current and post-current NDC periods?
- Outline the conditions for changes or revocation of LOA's as well as its consequences on carbon market participants and national accounting.
- Specify any share of proceeds, corresponding adjustment fees, automatic cancellations and/or sharing of revenues that may need to be paid by project participants to transact ITMOs and develop projects under the Article 6.4 mechanism.
- Prepare the necessary tracking and reporting obligations, including the setting up of the national registry, publication of LOA's as well as preparing the submission of the first Initial Report (IR) and annual Agreed Electronic Format (AEF) to UNFCCC; outlining how India fulfils Article 6 participation requirements and specifying the chosen accounting approach; Integration of Article 6 activities in the Biennial Transparency Report (BTR) to the UNFCCC; any additional reporting requirements established at the national level.



## 3. Expanding the List of Article 6 Eligible Activities

While MOEFCC has recently updated the list of Article 6 eligible activities to exclude clean cookstoves, a majority of activities outlined on the list are still assessed by IETA members to be of very high abatement costs with limited potential of supporting increased mitigation efforts in this decade. Based on internal consultations, the cost of eligible project activities such as green hydrogen, CCUS, tidal energy etc. would all require a carbon price several times higher than what both sovereign (countries) and most corporate buyers are paying in the market today. As an example, Singapore's carbon tax is currently 25 SGD/ton (1630 INR/tCO<sub>2</sub>e), with an expectation to increase to between 50-80 SGD or 3250-5230 INR/tCO<sub>2</sub>e by 2030. It can be expected that companies in Singapore are unlikely to buy International Carbon Credits (ICCs) at a higher price than their compliance obligations, unless for specific voluntary offsetting purposes.

Similarly, under Japan's GX-ETS, an upper price ceiling of JPY 4,300/tCO<sub>2</sub>e (approximately USD 28.7) for FY2027 has been established<sup>7</sup> which will limit the willingness of regulated entities to pay higher prices for international credits. In addition, Switzerland's KliK Foundation — a key sovereign buyer has reported an average procurement price of CHF 27/tCO<sub>2</sub>e (approximately USD 33) for Article 6.2-aligned credits in 2023



[7] ICAP April 2026, [Japan Transitions it's GX ETS to mandatory phase](#)

Expanding the list may help India in financing its long-term low emission development strategy (LT-LEDS) and bring in much needed international investments into low-carbon solutions. A few recommendations to be considered is presented below:


- Inclusion of additional sectors such natural based solutions and carbon removal (like agriculture, forestry, mangrove restoration, biochar, enhanced rock weathering, waste management, etc.) in the list of eligible activities to receive ITMO authorisation. Note that it will be important to work with high-integrity methodologies and project developers to support and ensure the permanence of such activities. These are likely to be one of the largest sources of supply for the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) which requires correspondingly adjusted credits and could significantly scale up India's mitigation ambitions over time.
- These projects can additionally help improve local livelihoods and environmental well-being, seamlessly aligning with India's national development schemes.
- Further consideration should be given to other types of projects that may also be eligible for ITMO authorisation, whilst specifying any buffers, the necessary fees and/or sharing of benefits to avoid any risk of overselling.
- A phased expansion of the positive list to include these sectors mentioned above, where internationally recognised methodologies already exist, domestic project developers are active, and development co-benefits are strong, would unlock a significant volume of creditable mitigation that is ready or near-ready to deliver. India need not open the entire market at once: a selective, phased expansion, sector by sector, preserves full government control over the pace and scale of authorisation while immediately signalling to international buyers that India is a serious Article 6 supply partner.

#### 4. Linking India's Nationally Determined Contribution 3.0 (NDC 3.0) to Article 6 Framework

The recent submission of India's updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC in April 2026 is a significant step towards articulating the country's long-term climate ambition and mitigation trajectory. Establishing clear linkages between the NDC and India's Article 6 framework will be critical to ensure environmental integrity, policy coherence, and effective participation in international carbon markets.

In particular, there is a need to provide clarity on how emission reductions authorised for international transfer will be accounted for in relation to India's NDC targets and how they will be treated beyond the NDC period, including the application of corresponding adjustments. Aligning the Article 6 framework with national climate goals will help safeguard domestic mitigation priorities while enabling India to strategically participate in global carbon markets.

In this context, IETA's paper "Scaling up NDC 3.0 Ambition through Article 6" (July 2025) highlights key building blocks for effective implementation, these elements can serve as useful reference points in strengthening India's Article 6 framework and ensuring its credible participation in international carbon markets.



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## 5. Standardised Article 6 and CORSIA- Compliant Letter of Authorisation Template:

One underappreciated bottleneck in operationalising Article 6 is that host country governments frequently lack the technical capacity to issue Letters of Authorisation (LOA) that are fully aligned with both Article 6 and CORSIA requirements. An LOA that omits key provisions can create serious downstream complications, delays and uncertainties for the parties involved.

A practical and low-cost solution would be for MoEFCC to adopt the standardised template developed by [UNFCCC](#) and [World Bank](#), or a menu of modular options, such as covering different project types, or buyer country requirements, and publish it as an open resource on the MoEFCC website. This can ensure that when authorisation is granted, the resulting LOA is immediately fit for purpose in international markets. Given that several buyer countries including Singapore, Switzerland, and Japan, have specific LOA requirements that must be reflected in the document itself, a template developed in consultation with those governments and with input from experienced crediting programmes would significantly reduce transaction friction and the risk of costly revisions later. We would consider this low-hanging fruit with a disproportionately high impact relative to the effort required.

## 6. Dedicated Article 6 and CORSIA Section in Indian Carbon Market Portal and Operational Playbook:

Beyond the letter of authorisation, project developers and investors, particularly those new to the Article 6 pathway, currently face a fragmented information environment. Guidance on eligible activities, authorisation procedures, registry requirements, corresponding adjustment processes, and CORSIA alignment is either unavailable, scattered across multiple ministry websites, or requires direct government engagement to obtain. This imposes a significant transaction cost, disproportionately disadvantaging smaller domestic developers who lack the legal and advisory resources to navigate the process independently.

We recommend that MoEFCC (in coordination with BEE) include in their recently launched Indian Carbon Market Portal (ICM), a dedicated Article 6 and CORSIA digital interface section serving as a single authoritative reference point. At a minimum, this should include: a step-by-step sequencing guide covering the full project lifecycle from activity identification through credit issuance and ITMO authorisation; the standardised LOA template and associated guidance; a clear articulation of the roles of each ministry and the expected timelines at each decision point; links to applicable UNFCCC reporting obligations; and a regularly updated FAQ addressing common questions from project developers and international buyers.

This kind of operational clarity and transparency signals institutional seriousness to international buyers and investors and could position India as a reliable, long-term Article 6 supply partner.

## 7. Balance NDC Achievement with Article 6 Exports with ITMO Authorisation

First, it is essential that India anchors its Article 6 participation within a robust NDC implementation roadmap, supported by detailed sectoral pathways and the integration of carbon markets as a tool to drive higher ambition. In this context, while the government could consider developing a Marginal Abatement Cost Curve (MACC) to identify low-cost versus high-cost mitigation opportunities. However, it must also consider activities which have sustainable development benefits, community and social benefits that arises from the projects which should be considered a factor for expansion of the positive list.

While we understand that some countries prioritise lower-cost mitigation activities for domestic NDC achievement, mitigation activities with comparatively lower marginal abatement cost do not always need to be sold at a lower cost. In some cases, international buyers may be willing to pay a premium for certain projects due to sustainable development co-benefits, even if they rank lower on a country's MACC. In this context, keeping some activities out of the positive list without considering market demand and pricing dynamics, could limit the flexibility and financial returns.

Second, India should adopt pricing and financial safeguard mechanisms to reflect the true value of exported mitigation outcomes. This could include introducing corresponding adjustment fees to account for the cost of replacing exported reductions, alongside administrative fees and potential contributions aligned with adaptation finance and overall mitigation of global emissions. This could then be used to re-invest in the domestic decarbonisation efforts. International examples demonstrate how such fee structures can simultaneously support domestic climate ambition, institutional capacity, and market participation. Additionally, exploring tools such as auctions can support price discovery and ensure that ITMOs are not undervalued in international markets.

Third, a targeted approach to sectoral and activity eligibility should be adopted. This may include prioritising exports from conditional NDC targets, while safeguarding activities critical for achieving unconditional targets.

Fourth, we recommend the government to consider tools and measures to reduce the risk of overselling ITMO's which could include introducing quantitative controls to manage supply and mitigate risk, including options such as caps on ITMO exports at the project, sectoral, or national level; limits on the percentage of credits that can be exported; and the use of buffer reserves to retain a portion of mitigation outcomes for future compliance needs.

Additional tools, such as limiting crediting periods for export or reserving a share of long-term mitigation benefits for domestic use, can further help balance investment attractiveness with national climate objectives. While introducing such quantitative limits is critical to safeguarding national climate goals, it is equally important that these measures are designed in a predictable and proportionate manner to avoid undermining project viability. Providing long-term policy certainty, differentiating limits across sectors, and balancing safeguards with investment incentives will be essential to ensure continued participation from project developers and sustained inflow of climate finance.

Critically, the design of any such limits must be informed through extensive stakeholder consultation, to ensure they strike a balance between safeguarding national interest and maintaining investment attractiveness, if the thresholds are set too high they may constrain project viability and deter private sector participation; conversely, if set too low, the host country risks foregoing potential economic and climate benefits. A well-consulted approach would be essential to ensure integrity and capital inflows.

For instance, several countries have adopted similar approaches to safeguard domestic mitigation potential: Ghana mandates a 1% retention of all issued mitigation outcomes for its NDC, Thailand has established a guideline setting a 3% cap on the international transfer of carbon credits relative to total emissions and Cambodia follows a case-by-case approach with a maximum retention cap of 10%, while Rwanda may determines retained volumes on a case-by-case basis.

Drawing from these international precedents, India could adopt an approach that combines baseline quantitative thresholds with case-by-case flexibility for specific sectors or project types, thereby positioning itself as a credible and strategic participant in global carbon markets while safeguarding its long-term decarbonisation objectives.

## 8. Pricing around Joint Credit Mechanism Projects

The current implementation of the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) between India and Japan faces a structural pricing misalignment that may constrain project viability and scale. Japanese private sector participants typically indicate a willingness to procure credits at or below ~USD 30/tCO<sub>2</sub>e, which is set as a price cap for compliance obligation, reflecting the cost expectations shaped by global voluntary carbon market trends and implementation of the GX-ETS in Japan.

However, many Indian JCM-eligible projects based on the Article 6 whitelist — particularly in sectors such as industrial decarbonisation, are capital-intensive and require a higher carbon price (often exceeding USD 100/tCO<sub>2</sub>e) to achieve financial viability and deliver reasonable returns. This creates a fundamental pricing disconnect between credit supply (India) and demand (Japan). As a result, these high-cost mitigation activities may struggle to secure sufficient demand in international markets, limiting the pipeline of bankable projects and constraining scale.

Additionally, Japanese buyers may increasingly have access to lower-cost mitigation opportunities in other geographies (e.g., Southeast Asia or Latin America), where marginal abatement costs are lower. This raise concerns that Indian projects could be at a competitive disadvantage within the JCM pipeline, potentially limiting investment flows into India.

Lastly, there is a need to provide clarity on eligible methodologies, project approval processes and export authorisation procedures under the JCM framework stakeholders as this will be critical for effective implementation of the process and project development.



## 9. Establish a Formal International Crediting Programmes (ICP) Recognition Framework for Article 6

At present, there are no approved methodologies/protocols that are simultaneously recognised by an ICP and aligned with India's Article 6 positive list. This gap is particularly acute for nature-based solutions, agricultural methane and waste management which have been excluded from the positive list, thereby significantly reducing the opportunity to leverage ready or near ready projects for investments through the Article 6 pathway.

Independent crediting programmes have invested decades in developing rigorous, peer-reviewed methodologies across a wide range of sectors, including afforestation and reforestation (ARR), soil carbon, agricultural methane, and landfill gas. Leveraging these established frameworks — rather than developing new methodologies from scratch — can significantly reduce time to first issuance, lower transaction costs, and enable faster market participation.

International experience indicates that most acquiring countries have already defined specific eligibility criteria, including permitted standards, project types, and methodologies. For instance, Singapore recognises International Carbon Credits (ICCs) from leading standards such as Gold Standard, Verra (VCS), Global Carbon Council (GCC), American Carbon Registry (ACR), and Architecture for REDD+ Transactions (ART), and has pre-qualified Climate Action Reserve (CAR) — while approving specific methodologies through a government-led review process. Singapore also demonstrates interoperability between its domestic carbon tax framework, CORSIA, and voluntary carbon markets. In contrast, countries such as Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and South Korea follow a case-by-case approval approach, with credits often procured directly by government entities or designated central buyers such as the KliK Foundation.

Given these market developments, India should develop a published framework for recognising international crediting programmes within its Article 6 authorisation system, using ICVCM CCP approval and/or CORSIA eligibility as the primary integrity benchmarks. This reduces the government's own assessment burden while providing a clear, credible signal to the market. Programmes meeting this standard should be eligible to have their credits considered for LoA issuance without requiring bespoke government methodology review from scratch.

## 10. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Transition to Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM)

We recommend that the Government of India provide clarity on the transition of existing carbon market projects which have applied for a transition from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to under the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM). As of 2026, 460 projects have submitted requests for transition to the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism<sup>7</sup>, reflecting developer interests to transition to the new mechanism. In this context, it is important for the government to clarify whether it intends to apply any vintage restrictions on eligible projects, beyond those agreed at COP26, which currently allow only projects registered on or after 1 January 2013 to transition. Additionally, it will be important to communicate any additional rules, evaluation criteria, and timelines for approval of transition requests that would provide much-needed certainty to project developers and investors as the deadline for the host country to approve the transition is extended to 30 June 2026.

The government may also consider articulating its position on the rationale for any additional safeguards if proposed. It is important to note that approval of the transition is a no-cost administrative process for the host country and does not in itself imply providing an authorisation. The government retains full discretion whether to grant authorisation at a later stage based on national priorities and market condition as reflected in COP29 6.4 decision – para 11, refer [here](#)

Furthermore, even if approvals are provided for the projects to transition, this wouldn't oblige the government to provide corresponding adjustments as such an adjustment would only be required if the developer decides to sell mitigation outcomes and transfer internationally for compliance use or used towards other countries NDC use, the implications of integrity risks on host country's remain limited, the transition of legacy projects does not affect India's emissions accounting. Therefore, any integrity-related concerns would be largely reputational rather than posing a direct risk to India's NDC achievement.



[8] [List of CDM activities in transition | UNFCCC](#)

## 11. Clear Categorisation of Carbon Credits under Private Law

To enable a market mechanism to function, it is necessary for market participants to have a legally robust framework defining ownership and associated rights under private law. Such frameworks create greater certainty in sale and purchase transactions, enable secured financing and facilitate the use of existing global markets' infrastructure and financing.

In this context, IETA is working closely with the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). The Working Group is developing Principles to clarify the legal nature of carbon credits under private law, with the final guidance expected in latter half of 2026. As recognised in the draft Principles, legal uncertainty remains a key barrier to scaling finance and market efficiency, and these Principles aim to provide clearer rules for ownership, transfer and enforceability.

As Principles, they need to be enacted in domestic law to be binding. Aligning India's legal frameworks with the Principles would provide certainty in the market and facilitate financing to climate mitigation projects.

## 12. Strengthen Coordination Across Ministries and States and Capacity Building across Stakeholders

The government should establish formal coordination mechanisms across central ministries and state governments to ensure effective implementation of Article 6 activities. Currently, several state governments are independently engaging with investors, often with limited coordination with central authorities and varying levels of understanding of the overall carbon market landscape and investor requirements.

To address this, the government should consider creating an inter-ministerial coordination framework with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for central and state authorities including approval, monitoring, and authorisation. Strengthening institutional alignment and engaging states early in the process will be critical to unlocking project pipelines, avoiding regulatory fragmentation, and scaling Article 6 activities across sectors and geographies.

In parallel, the government should prioritise capacity building and awareness generation among local stakeholders, including private sector entities, project developers, NGOs, and local communities, to strengthen participation, collaboration, and institutional readiness for Article 6 implementation. Targeted technical workshops, stakeholder engagement platforms, and knowledge-sharing initiatives can help build a stronger ecosystem capable of supporting the government in implementing high-integrity and credible carbon market activities in India.

## CONCLUSION

IETA appreciates the opportunity to provide inputs to the Government of India on the development of its Article 6 framework. A clear, predictable, and market-aligned framework will be critical to unlocking India's significant potential to attract climate finance, scale mitigation activities, and position itself as a leading supplier of high-integrity carbon credits.

IETA remains committed to supporting the Government of India through continued engagement with policymakers and stakeholders via the IETA India Taskforce.

### For further information, please contact:

Kajol Tandon  
India Representative, IETA  
[tandon@ieta.org](mailto:tandon@ieta.org)

Andrea Bonzanni  
International Policy Director  
[Bonzanni@ieta.org](mailto:Bonzanni@ieta.org)

Bjorn Fonden  
International Policy Advisor  
[fonden@ieta.org](mailto:fonden@ieta.org)

Nikhil Agarwal  
IETA India Taskforce Co-chair  
[nagarwal@ckinetics.com](mailto:nagarwal@ckinetics.com)

Apurba Mitra  
IETA India Taskforce Co-chair  
[apurbamitra@kpmg.com](mailto:apurbamitra@kpmg.com)

# IETA

Headquarters  
Grand-Rue 11  
CH-1204 Genève  
Switzerland  
+41 22 737 05 00

Brussels  
Rue du Commerce  
Handelsstraat 123  
1000 Brussels Belgium  
+32 2 893 02 39

Washington  
1001 Pennsylvania Ave. NW  
Suite 7117  
Washington, DC 20004  
+1 470 222 IETA (4382)

Toronto  
180 John Street  
Toronto, ON M5T 1X5

Singapore  
62 Ubi Road 1 #04-24 Oxley  
Bizhub 2  
Singapore 408734

IETA also has  
representation in: Argentina,  
Brazil, China, Colombia,  
Italy, Japan, Spain and the  
UK.

[ieta.org](http://ieta.org)